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ABSTRACT
Fraud has increasingly become recognised as a
problem in the private sector, with a growing
number of estimates of the size of the problem
produced by official government bodies and pri-
vate professional services companies such as
KPMG. There have, however, been fewer sur-
veys of the strategies being used by the private
sector to tackle fraud. This paper presents findings
from a survey of the UK's FTSE 100 companies
which produced 32 responses and the strategies
they are using to counter fraud. It demonstrates a
mixed picture of both good and bad practice,
when benchmarked against well-recognised stand-
ards for tackling fraud, on issues such as having:
a strategy; a designated person responsible for
fraud; regular risk assessments; preventative
measures; investigative resources and effective
relationships with the police. It also calls for
further research to be conducted on private sector
counter fraud strategies.
INTRODUCTION
Fraud is a major cost to society. Levi,
Burrows, Fleming, and Hopkins (2007)
recently very conservatively estimated that
the nature, extent and impact of fraud is in
the region of £14 billion (per annum) in
the UK alone. This is a substantial figure
and one that should register concern with
every company regardless of the sector in
which it trades. More significantly, around
half of the estimated £14 billion mentioned
above is lost to fraud in the private sector.
The American Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) in its 2006 Report
to the Nation, which only focuses upon
‘occupational fraud’ (so excludes external
frauds) found the median estimate of losses
from corporations revenues was 5 per cent,
which if replicated across the USA would
amount to £652 billion (American Associ-
ation of Certified Fraud Examiners
[ACFE], 2007). The report found that the
median loss was $159,000, but nearly a
quarter of cases caused losses of at least
$1 million and there were nine cases of
£1 billion or more! Again, the limitations
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are clear from such a study as it is only
occupational fraud and based upon a survey
of Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs). Both
of these studies illustrate that in the UK and
USA fraud is a major cost to private busi-
ness. The estimates above come from just
two of the numerous studies seeking to
estimate the fraud losses of the private
sector across the globe (see, eg, KPMG,
2004a, 2004b, 2006; Shury, Speed, Vivian,
Kuechell, & Nicholas, 2003).
There have, however, been relatively few
studies seeking to examine the counter
fraud strategies used by the private sector to
police fraud. One of the few is the large
professional services provider Ernst &
Young, which conducts a global fraud sur-
vey every few years and in 2006 published
its ninth edition. The 2006 survey included
586 respondents from 20 countries, which
included some countries considered to be
‘emerging markets’ such as Brazil, China,
India and Russia (Ernst & Young, 2006).
PricewaterhouseCoopers has also funded a
major survey of private companies which,
although yielding extensive data on fraud,
only touches upon the strategies being used
to combat fraud (Bussmann & Werle, 2006).
In the public sector in the UK there is also
an annual HM Treasury survey of public
bodies and their counter fraud strategies,
but this survey does not cover the private
sector or local government (HM Treasury,
2005, 2006, 2007).
The limited research assessing in depth
what private companies are doing to tackle
fraud suggested that a preliminary study was
required. We therefore decided to under-
take a survey of the FTSE 100 (i.e., the 100
largest capitalised companies trading on the
London Stock Exchange). The aim was to
find out what the largest and most success-
ful companies in the UK were doing to
tackle fraud. This, if successful, would then
provide insights for a wider study into the
private sector’s counter fraud strategies in
the FTSE 250, as well as many small and
medium sized enterprises (usually known as
SMEs). It was also felt that publication of
the results would be timely given the recent
recommendations of the Fraud Review
(2006) and the changing national counter
fraud infrastructure that is emerging as a
consequence. The results we present cover
32 responses from the 100 questionnaires
sent out. This is a relatively small sample,
but we believe, given the lack of detailed
data on private sector strategies, that it
deserves to be published to stimulate further
debate and research of the private sector
approach to policing fraud. This paper will
set out the methodology used and then
examine the results of our survey. Before we
embark upon that, however, it is necessary
to set out a model counter fraud strategy.
MODEL COUNTER FRAUD STRATEGY
The identification of a model counter fraud
strategy is essential to conducting this sur-
vey because one of our other aims was to
benchmark what the FTSE companies are
doing against best practice. For the private
sector there is no established benchmark of
best practice for countering fraud, whereas
in the public sector there have been a
variety of best practice guides promulgated
by the government and other prestigious
bodies. Managing the Risk of Fraud: A Guide
for Managers (HM Treasury, 2003) and Good
Practice in Tackling External Fraud (National
Audit Office & HM Treasury, 2004) are
examples from central government. The
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and
Accountancy (CIPFA) (2006) has also con-
tributed to the development of best practice
with its document Managing the Risk of
Fraud Actions to Counter Fraud and Corruption
(which in turn was heavily influenced by
the National Health Service (NHS) model
which started in 1998). The model used in
the NHS is also considered to be best
practice given the impressive results
returned by the NHS Counter Fraud and
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Security Management Service (CFSMS),
which has brought a 12 to 1 return on
investment, saving £811 million for the
NHS (NHS CFSMS, 2007a). (There was
other research published prior to 2007
which also indicated the high return on
investment (see NHS CFSMS, 2003).)
However, for the sake of clarity, if we distil
the best practice from the above we are left
with some of the following strategies:
● designating a person with responsibility
for counter fraud strategy
● the possession of a counter fraud
strategy
● measurement of fraud on a regular basis,
including evaluation of counter fraud
strategies
● anti-fraud culture strategies such as gen-
eral fraud awareness training
● fraud prevention strategies
● vetting of staff/contractors in key posi-
tions of trust/sensitivity
● independent whistle-blowing mechan-
isms
● employment of or access to professionally
trained counter fraud specialist (CFS)
● effective partnership with other relevant
bodies
● pursuit of civil and criminal sanctions
against fraudsters
● pursuit of financial redress.
The elements of the above strategies will be
considered in more depth in the results
section. Before we embark upon that, we
will set out our methodology.
METHODOLOGY
In order to assess the level at which the
private sector considers fraud an important
issue, we decided to undertake a postal
survey of the most successful companies in
the UK in the FTSE 100. As these are the
largest, complicated and most successful
companies, one would expect there to be
counter fraud strategies in place. Therefore,
in November 2006 we sent 100 question-
naires to the companies in the FTSE 100.
The questionnaire contained both open and
closed questions, was accompanied by a
letter and was directed at the chief execut-
ive, with a request to pass it on to the
person with responsibility for countering
fraud. We informed the recipients of our
questionnaire that we had set a deadline
date of January 2007. Reminder letters
were sent in the hope of increasing our
response rate as we closed in on our dead-
line date. In total, we received 32 responses.
This is not a substantial response rate. How-
ever, since we only set aside three months
in which to respond to our questionnaire,
our response rate of nearly one-third is a
promising return. Our survey reflected the
elements of a model counter fraud strategy
mentioned earlier with questions seeking
information from companies on what they
were doing in each of those areas.
There are of course limitations to this
research. Basing a paper on 32 responses
provides only a limited foundation, but it
was felt that the findings warranted publica-
tion to stimulate further research and debate
in an area in which there has been very
limited academic interest. It is also difficult
to operationalise and define such a slippery
term as fraud. For example, as illustrated by
Doig (2006, pp. 19–21) fraud is associated
with a range of orthodox activities; it is
about deception, it is careless, reckless
behaviour and/or is carried out with crim-
inal intent. Rather than specifically define
fraud and restrict the responses open to us,
we took the decision to enable respondents
to decide what they considered constituted
fraud. The expectation was this ‘open’
approach would secure a wide response.
One of the consequences of this was that
most companies made limited reference to
key financial reporting controls such as the
(US) Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which we would
have expected.
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RESULTS
As we mentioned earlier, we received a total
of 32 responses out of the questionnaires
sent. In this response there are a number of
different companies working in different
sectors of the business world. The approx-
imate annual revenue of those that
responded ranged from £249.2 million to
more than £132 billion, with some
employing more than 400,000 staff. Table 1
below illustrates the different sectors which
the 32 respondents were from. It shows the
two biggest groups were manufacturing and
banking/finance, accounting for just over
40 per cent. With such a range in revenue
and employees and size of company, the
seriousness and consideration given to
counter fraud measures also differed
markedly.
Counter fraud strategy
One would expect any large organisation to
have some type of strategy to counter fraud,
given the large number of studies illustrat-
ing the potential size of the problem. Of the
32 responses, 18 claimed to have a counter
fraud strategy, ten were without a strategy
and one admitted it was unaware either
way; the rest (3 companies) did not answer.
Given that, in the financial services sector,
the regulator, the Financial Services
Authority, mandates minimum standards
for addressing financial crime and money
laundering, just under a third of the 18 (the
five financial services companies that
responded) had to have a strategy and this
illustrates the poor commitment to this
approach amongst the wider FTSE 100
respondents. Part of any counter fraud strat-
egy is assessing the effectiveness of the
approach taken. This can range from a
review with audit, a measure of how vul-
nerable a company is to fraud, to regular
production of management information
such as statistics, and assessment and analysis
of cases investigated and what is learnt from
them.
A few of the following responses clearly
illustrate the range of counter fraud strat-
egies employed by those companies in the
FTSE 100. One company claimed that:
Actual and attempted fraud instances are
collated and logged. In this way levels of
fraud are kept under constant review
(FTSE100Q81).
However, perhaps less systematic than
above, one company claimed:
We undertake fraud vulnerability assess-
ments where appropriate and ‘regular
management information is produced’
reflecting the range of counter fraud
strategies employed (FTSE100Q15).
Furthermore, another company stated that
it had:
Regular Sarbanes-Oxley testing of key
financial reporting controls; internal
audit reviews of the adequacy of fraud
risk management across the Group
(FTSE100Q31).
Designated person
Of the 32 responses, 26 had a designated
person responsible for counter fraud and 6
Table 1: Responses by sector
Organisation Responses
Transport 2
Telecoms 2
Construction 4
Consumer goods 3
Natural resources 3
Manufacturing 4
Services 4
Retailing 3
Energy 2
Banking and Finance 5
Total 32
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were without a specific designated person.
Across the FTSE 100 companies which
responded to our questionnaire, there was a
wide range of job titles and reporting struc-
tures for those considered to be the named
responsible person for counter fraud. These
ranged from Counter Fraud and Forensic
Accounting Officer, Director of Fraud,
Financial Crime Manager and Head of
Audit and Operational Risk, to Head
of Loss Prevention and Security, Head of
Profit Protection, Head of Compliance and
Director of Audit.
While some companies had a specific
named person to deal with counter fraud,
in others it was indicated that counter fraud
was a shared responsibility, which seemed to
fall to the Head or Director of Risk or
Security in the company. In one company,
counter fraud appeared to be shared
amongst a number of employees with no
clear indication to who was responsible for
counter fraud. This has to be considered an
unsatisfactory approach. A clearly desig-
nated person whose remit is to deal with
counter fraud issues is an essential element
of a successful counter fraud strategy. After
all, with a clear remit and knowledge of
fraud such a person could be a conduit to
broadcast fraud issues in a company and
raise awareness, prevent fraud, develop an
anti-fraud culture and work and liaise with
the police or Serious Fraud Office if
required, and produce a report for the com-
pany board. From our results it also appears
that there is a variety of reporting structures
in place. Similar to the above mentioned
approach, counter fraud issues can be
reported to a Chief Executive, Finance
Director, Head of Risk or Security or Chair
of the Audit Committee.
Risk assessments
Of the 32 responses, 27 companies indic-
ated that they had some type of fraud risk
assessment, 3 responded that they had no
risk assessment and 1 worryingly had no
idea if it had any risk assessment at all.
While this is of some concern, more
worrying is the frequency at which a fraud
risk assessment is undertaken. From our
responses a few of the companies stated that
fraud risk assessments are an ongoing pro-
cess. We too would suggest that this is the
most appropriate approach to use to
counter fraud. This is emphasised here since
without continuous assessment it is possible
that a culture and acceptance of fraud might
develop. Further responses showed that
some companies indicated that they under-
took a risk assessment monthly, some quar-
terly, bi-annually, annually, and periodically
(eg, 1–3 years). Fraud is an ongoing prob-
lem, which needs continuous monitoring
and assessment. For a counter fraud strategy
to be successful, regardless of the risk assess-
ment strategy in place, the frequency of the
assessment is of paramount importance.
In addition to this, some of our responses
indicated that fraud risk assessments were
dependent on the type of risk, eg, fraud in
or from a foreign country (see Ernst &
Young, 2006) and/or company with which
the FTSE 100 company will deal, and the
introduction of a new company product. It
is hoped, however, that before any new
product is introduced to the market, eg, a
specific financial product, a manufactured
product (chemical or industrial) or one of
personal identification, all aspects of fraud
would be considered.
Prevention and anti-fraud culture
Screening a new employee, contractor and/
or supplier is also an important part of the
preventative aspects of a counter fraud strat-
egy. However, for a counter fraud strategy
to be successful, screening of employees,
contractors and suppliers should be on-
going. The approach taken regarding
employees and risk assessment is interview,
reference checks, credit checks and request-
ing original documentation such as qual-
ifications etc. For contractors and suppliers
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it appears from our survey that they are
assessed for a conflict of interest, and checks
are made on VAT numbers and similar spe-
cific identifiers, combined with a credit
reference and Companies House search. It
was also noted that many of the FTSE 100
companies kept and reviewed their lists of
contractors and suppliers. From the
information we have received, it appears
that, if a FTSE 100 company is working in
partnership in some capacity with another
company that is under contract and provid-
ing a service, a far more extensive risk
assessment is undertaken than if directly
employed by the company. Their customers,
stakeholders and partners are left in no
doubt as to how serious the matter of fraud
is for some. For example, one company
made it explicitly clear when saying:
We try to regularly improve our cus-
tomer vetting to prevent fraud. We create
an anti-fraud culture by issuing strategic
communications to key stakeholders in
the business (FTSE100Q18).
This is perhaps understandable since the
company purchasing a service should make
sure that it is getting the service it has
requested and is paying for and that it is a
creditable company to do business with.
However, this can also be said of its own
employees. Full-time employees commit a
substantial amount of fraud (BDO Stoy
Hayward, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2003; Gill,
2005; Hollinger & Davis, 2006; KPMG,
2007), and yet, from our survey, it appears
that there are far more stringent and com-
prehensive risk assessments undertaken
regarding ‘external’ companies and their
employees than those ‘internal’ employees
who are familiar with their company, its
practices, methods of operation etc.
Developing an anti-fraud culture is con-
sidered a major part of a preventative strat-
egy. One of the tools used to achieve this is
various forms of staff training. Of the 32
responses we received, 21 had ‘general staff
training’. This general training appeared to
revolve around raising the awareness of
counter fraud issues. For example, some of
the responses we received regarding this
matter are comprehensive. One respondent
stated:
Embedded control procedures including
fraud policy and whistleblowing proced-
ures, code of conduct and induction
(FTSE100Q4).
While another FTSE 100 company had a
clear established approach where:
There is a published Anti-Fraud policy.
We also deliver fraud awareness training
and issue fraud awareness bulletins
(FTSE100Q12).
It was pleasing to see that 31 of the 32
responses stated that they were actively pur-
suing measures to prevent fraud and create
an anti-fraud culture; only one company
indicated that it was not in the process of
developing an anti-fraud culture.
The nature and approach taken in devel-
oping an anti-fraud culture, however, varied
across the respondents. For example, in
some companies, all new employees were
introduced to the problem of fraud as
part of the company induction. In other
instances some employees attended an
annual finance fraud conference, some were
offered the opportunity to update their
knowledge and some had specially commis-
sioned packages depending on their line of
business. In addition to this varied approach
in developing an anti-fraud culture, it also
appears that all employees were trained
when specific frauds or a series of frauds
were discovered. Although this is laudable,
our concern here is that preventative meas-
ures should already be part of a counter
fraud strategy. While we are aware that it is
Policing fraud in the private sector
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impossible for every company to predeter-
mine every type of fraud it might en-
counter, it has no excuse for the majority of
them. Regardless of its ‘business’, it must be
aware that certain areas of its ‘business’ are
more vulnerable to fraud than others and
that the assessment of risk mentioned above
is an integral part of developing an anti-
fraud strategy and anti-fraud culture.
However, some of the responses we
received illustrated that many companies are
now beginning to cultivate a clear anti-
fraud culture. In response to our survey
many companies have made reference to:
fraud awareness bulletins, use of the intranet
to disseminate information regarding fraud,
holding fraud risk workshops to identify
potential fraud risks and actions that are
needed to counteract them, strict financial
control permeating throughout the com-
pany and, significantly, the development of
specific whistleblowing procedures.
In the final part of this section a note of
caution is needed. Any company that takes
fraud seriously and has, or is in the process
of developing a counter fraud strategy is to
be commended. However, the development
of an anti-fraud culture is of limited value if
employees have no clear direction as to
what fraud is, or how it might possibly
emerge. A codified set of guidelines regard-
ing fraud, ethical behaviour, a set code of
conduct, response plan(s) and anti-fraud
policies alone are insufficient. If we fail to
educate and hold accountable those who
ignore, break or circumvent ‘codes of con-
duct’, then our attitude to fraud is unlikely
to change. After all, as Ernst & Young
(2003) noted, Enron had a code of ethics
and a whistleblower mechanism, and yet
neither worked. A strategy needs direction
and clear codes of conduct, which need to
be enforced if it has any chance of success.
Issuing a counter fraud policy is the start of
a counter fraud strategy: it is not an end in
itself.
Reporting fraud
Whistleblowing has gained much greater
prominence in the boardrooms of com-
panies with the passage of the Public Inter-
est and Disclosure Act 1998, the publication
of the British Standard PAS 1998/2008
Code of Practice on Whistleblowing
Arrangements, and the services offered by
bodies such as Public Concern at Work.
Such measures are advocated for the much
wider purpose of exposing wrongdoing,
but independent whistleblowing mechan-
isms also have a very important part to play
in a counter fraud strategy. There have been
a number of high profile frauds where the
mechanisms to expose them have been
regarded as weak (Levi, 2006). Frequently, a
manager is suspected of fraud by his or her
employees, but for them to make allegations
against that manager to the manager’s
superior is often fraught with risk. The
manager’s superior might be in on the scam
or simply dismiss the allegation, leaving the
exposing employee exposed. One of our
main concerns in the survey was what, if
any, processes were in place to report fraud
independent of management, particularly
internal fraud. If an employee did not want
to report a fraud to his or her line manager,
many had the option of a hotline or
whistleblowing mechanism. For example,
one company claimed that it had a:
Whistleblowing programme, strong dis-
ciplinary action, report criminal acts to
authorities (police); articles in corporate
news; fraud policy (FTSE100Q27).
Furthermore, and perhaps due to emerging
markets, another company felt it necessary
to have a:
Whistleblower hotline available globally
. . . documented and robust internal
control environment; fraud response plan
under development; consistent and
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vigorous response to incidents
(FTSE100Q31).
However, while such statements are
encouraging, little information was forth-
coming from our survey on the process of
whistleblowing and how it should work. A
company can claim to have an internal
policy and process where employees can
raise their concern regarding other
employees; however, what advice, protec-
tion and support is in place for the whistle-
blower is of paramount importance. This
area is clearly in need of much more
research.
Counter fraud specialists
Of the 32 companies which responded to
our survey, 17 employed dedicated counter
fraud staff, which in total amounted to 160
employees, while 13 had no specialist staff,
and 2 did not answer the question. From
this information it appeared that 14 pro-
vided training for their specific counter
fraud staff, 1 company claimed that it did
not provide training, 1, worryingly, did not
know if it provided training for its staff and
the rest did not answer the question.
Furthermore, from the 17 companies
which responded to our survey that claimed
to have trained counter fraud staff, it is
apparent that there is no specific counter
fraud qualification recognised by the FTSE
100. This contrasts with the public sector
where the Accredited Counter Fraud
Specialist (ACFS) has become the norm
(Button, Johnston, Frimpong, & Smith
2007). Although one company stated that it
had its counter fraud staff trained and
accredited by the Counter Fraud Profes-
sional Accreditation Board (CFPAB), there
were a diverse range of other courses used
such as: the Telecommunications United
Kingdom Fraud Forum (TUFF), i2 Train-
ing, CIFAS Fraud Training, Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), a
Diploma in Fraud Investigations, the use of
qualified external consultants, ad hoc provi-
sion from third-party providers and in-
house courses and seminars made available
to employees.
The variety of different organisations that
offer counter fraud courses/training is
hardly surprising. As a nascent profession,
the counter fraud profession has only
recently received the recognition it perhaps
should have (Button et al., 2007). There-
fore, it appears that organisations in the
private sector, unlike public bodies which
are represented and involved with the
CFPAB, tend to use an organisation that is
specifically related to their line of work.
This is represented in the types of external
and internal fraud investigated by the FTSE
100. The types of fraud range across credit
card fraud, embezzlement, theft of a per-
son’s identification, cash theft, and mis-
appropriation of assets, theft of company
property, salary and payroll fraud, insurance
and health care fraud and many others that
fall under the broad canopy of fraud.
Cooperation and sanctions
It appears from our survey that cooperation
with other companies during a counter
fraud investigation is limited. Of the 32
respondents 19 claimed that they had
worked with or had recourse to liaising
with another agency in the course of an
investigation, with one company clearly
stating that it did not work with anybody
else. The rest did not respond to the ques-
tion regarding cooperation. As we would
expect if any cooperation, collaboration or
advice were required, law enforcement
organisations such as the police, Serious and
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the
majority of our 19 respondents contacted
HM Customs and Revenue and the Finan-
cial Services Authority (FSA). While other
investigative bodies such as the Telecom-
munications UK Fraud Forum and those
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involved in the world of finance and insur-
ance depending on the circumstances of the
crime, were contacted, it appears that the
company that has knowingly experienced
fraud can draw on a range of different
organisations and sanctions to ‘punish’ or
discipline the offender(s).
Once an investigation has reached what
we might refer to as the ‘sanction stage’,
then it appears that the seriousness of the
fraud seems to be the main factor in decid-
ing what type of sanction should in fact be
pursued. This is perhaps similar to the evid-
ential and public interest test that the
Crown Prosecution Service uses to judge
whether a case should go forward. The
difference here, however, is that the com-
pany, perhaps alone or possibly in conjunc-
tion with the police, might prefer to use
internal procedure and ‘discipline’ the
offender without recourse to the criminal
law. Indeed, one of the findings from Buss-
mann and Werle’s (2007) global survey was
that only 51 per cent of internal and
external perpetrators of economic crime
were charged in the criminal courts.
It is debatable, however, to what extent a
public prosecution will be pursued by the
private sector, particularly maximum deter-
rence with recourse to the criminal justice
system. After all, a private sector company
would generally rather deal with fraud pri-
vately than risk public exposure (Doig,
2006; Gill & Hart, 1997; Levi, 1987).
Regardless of this, no company will accept
a small percentage of the estimated loss
mentioned at the start of this paper — £14
billion — without some kind of restitution.
Consequently, the range of sanctions used
across the FTSE 100 to resolve a matter of
fraud might be categorised in the following
ways: dismissal without sanction, internal
disciplinary procedure, suspension for a
period of time, closure of accounts, noti-
fication of offender to credit reference and
fraud prevention agencies, recovery of all
assets/money where possible and, ulti-
mately, criminal prosecution.
The relationship with the police
Once the company has decided it wants to
initiate criminal proceedings, depending on
the seriousness and severity of the fraud
committed, it has to contact the relevant
law enforcement agency. In this case it is
primarily the police. Given that past
research has suggested a lack of police inter-
est, we sought to discover if this also applied
to FTSE 100 companies (Levi, 1987, 2003).
We therefore asked to what extent those
detected cases of fraud were actually passed
to the police to initiate the prosecution
process. From our survey the breakdown of
information is as follows: 9 out of the 23
responses stated that all cases of detected
fraud (100 per cent) were sent to the police,
2 companies claimed that this happened 90
per cent of the time, 1 company suggested
that it happened approximately 80–90 per
cent of the time, with another company
clearly saying its cases were sent to the
police 80 per cent of the time. Further-
more, 2 companies claimed they sent the
cases to the police less than 50 per cent of
the time, with another company qualifying
this by saying that it was dependent on the
‘police’ region. Even more worrying is that
1 company sent its cases less than 10 per
cent of the time, 1 sent them around 5 per
cent of the time, one claimed that it was
insignificant, 3 had no idea if a case had
been sent and 1 claimed that it did not
matter as fraud was detected prior to provi-
sion (opening) of the account.
This low level of police contact is worry-
ing. However, some of the responses we
received clearly answered our concern. For
example, one company said that:
The police are particularly unresponsive
and uncooperative (FTSE100Q7).
Other FTSE 100 companies appeared to
concur with this view claiming that:
Brooks, Button and Frimpong
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Police not interested in frauds of less than
£100K!! Poor response generally!
FTSE100Q10.
Police do not appear to take cases of
‘minor’ fraud seriously. You have to pre-
pare the case for the police, ie evidence,
etc, without this, they [the police] are
not too interested in a minor offence
(FTSE100Q11).
Anecdotal evidence suggests a low like-
lihood of police involvement in fraud
below £100K in the UK. Crown Pro-
secution Service adds another layer that
may still lead to no prosecution
(FTSE100Q20).
There was also other evidence to suggest a
good response from some police forces.
One respondent claimed:
We receive strong support from North-
umbria Police (Local Force Area) in all
cases referred to them. Cases referred to
other force areas have not always received
the same level of commitment
(FTSE10012).
Yet another company in the FTSE 100
applauded the way in which the police dealt
with fraud:
City of London Police excellent; Lothian
and Borders Police excellent; Metro-
politan Police, very good; West Midlands
very good. The rest leave a lot to be
desired (FTSE100Q26).
It is understandable that the City of London
Police are considered excellent with their
record on responding to fraud; it is less
evident why, and with such a geographical
spread, Lothian and Borders Police and the
West Midlands Police are thought of so
highly too. It appears from the data that
there is no clear pattern across all police
forces of their attitude to fraud. With such a
mixed approach it is difficult to draw a
conclusion. However, what is apparent is
that the relationship or impression of the
police from the FTSE 100 respondents is
that they range from ‘particularly
unresponsive and uncooperative’, with a
reluctance ‘to take on business crime’ to
‘not interested if minor offence’. It also
appears though, that some police forces are
excellent, such as the City of London, the
Lothian and Borders and also the North-
umbria Police, and positive feedback was
provided on the response of the Metro-
politan and West Midlands Police.
There also seemed to be some disap-
pointment with the lack of resources that
the police had to deal with fraud issues,
which led to comments such as:
In the UK the Police will not undertake
major fraud on our behalf. They require
the evidence to be provided to them
once we have undertaken our own
investigations (FTSE100Q21).
Furthermore, this same company continued
to make an interesting point, one that
clearly illustrated the global nature of fraud
and the problems which a company, no
matter how powerful, will encounter as it
seeks out new markets. The company stated
that:
Also, because . . . PLC operates across
the world . . . in many third world coun-
tries there is no fraud investigation cap-
ability by the local police. Corruption is
so rife we are often compelled to apply
preventive measures and then take no
further action (FTSE100Q21).
Conclusion
The policing of fraud in the UK’s largest
companies provides a mixed picture. From
this small survey it is clear that, of those
companies in the FTSE 100 that responded
to our questionnaire, there are some with
sound counter fraud strategies and pro-
cedures in place, but there is also evidence
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of significant gaps in the counter fraud
strategies as judged against benchmark strat-
egies. The possession of a counter fraud
strategy, regular fraud risk assessments, the
promotion of anti-fraud cultures, reporting
mechanisms and full use of sanctions were
all found to be wanting in many of the
respondents. Clearly this is a relatively small
survey and further research is required, not
just on the FTSE 100, but reaching out to
the wider private sector and particularly
SMEs. This and future research should be
used to inform further developments in the
promotion of best practice, that is much
more influenced by the needs of the private
sector in policing fraud. Given that one of
the major recommendations of the Fraud
Review was for a National Fraud Strategic
Authority to develop a national counter
fraud strategy, which is now coming to
fruition, one of its priorities will clearly be
to secure further information on the extent
and quality of counter fraud strategies in the
private sector and to identify a model strat-
egy, which is then actively promoted
(Attorney General’s Office, 2008; Fraud
Review Team, 2006). If the evidence from
this small survey is typical of the private
sector, there will be much work to do, but
also many rewards to be reaped in more
effective counter fraud strategies that reduce
the cost of fraud to society.
NOTE
1 All responses following are accompanied
by an indication of the specific question
in the survey instrument (ie., FTSE100
Q8) indicating question 8 in that
document.
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